The Court noted the
following with respect to the applicable law: "[t]he standard on a
motion to set aside the jury's verdict as against the weight of the evidence is
whether the evidence so preponderated in favor of the movant that the verdict
could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the
evidence...[f]urthermore, the amount of damages to be awarded for pain and
suffering is primarily a question of fact and considerable deference should be
accorded to the interpretation of the evidence by the jury...[a]s frequently
observed, awards for pain and suffering cannot be precisely quantified and
their reasonableness is measured by reviewing comparable cases, and analyzing
such factors as 'the nature, extent and permanency of the injuries, the extent
of past, present and future pain and the long-term effects of the
injury'...[t]he challenge on a motion such as this is the inherently subjective
nature of non-economic awards which will not produce mathematically precise
results and the shortage of 'comparable cases' entombed in memorandum opinions
with limited facts - a task which 'is easier said than done.'"
The
Court ultimately held that the jury's award of no damages for past pain and
suffering could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the
evidence, and that the jury's future pain and suffering award without setting
forth the period of years of which such amounts were intended to provide
compensation was problematic. As a result, the Court ordered a new trial
on the issue of damages for the plaintiff's past and future pain and
suffering.
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