Wednesday, March 4, 2020

Motion for Directed Verdict Decision Reversed

In Creutzberger v. County of Suffolk, et al (Index No. 39984/08, decided on February 26, 2020), the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a trial court's decision that denied a defendants' motion for a directed verdict pertaining to an issue of creation of a dangerous condition.  The case arose in September, 2007, when the plaintiff, while attending a music festival at property owned by the County of Suffolk and occupied by the Long Island Maritime Museum, was caused to fall and sustain injuries after the bicycle he was riding on grass struck the edge of a portion of a boardwalk.  Thereafter, he commenced a lawsuit against the aforesaid entities, alleging, among other things, that the defendants breached their duty to adequately illuminate the incident location area, and that they created a dangerous condition by cutting the grass to the same level as the boardwalk, thereby concealing the height differential between the boardwalk and the grass path. 

The matter proceeded to a jury trial, and after the plaintiff presented his direct case, the defendants' attorneys made a CPLR 4401 motion for a directed verdict to dismiss plaintiff's case.  The motion included an argument that the plaintiff failed, as a matter of law, to prove that the defendants created a dangerous condition, and as such, the plaintiff's case should be dismissed.  The trial court denied the motion, and thereafter the jury found that the County of Suffolk was 45% at fault, the Long Island Maritime Museum was 40% at fault, and that the plaintiff was 15% at fault.  On appeal, however, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the trial court's aforesaid motion for directed verdict decision, holding as follows:

"A trial court's grant of a CPLR 4401 motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate where the trial court finds that, upon evidence presented, there is no rational process which the fact trier could base a finding in favor of the nonmoving party...Where, as here, a municipality has enacted a prior written notice statue, it may not be subjected to liability for a defect within the scope of the law unless it received prior written notice of the defect or an exception to the prior written notice requirement applies...The only two recognized exceptions to a prior written notice requirement are the municipality's affirmative creation of a defect or where the defect is created by the municipality's special use of the property...

Here, the plaintiff asserted that the requirement for prior written notice was obviated because the defendants created a dangerous or defective condition through an affirmative act of negligence by cutting the grass to the same level as the boardwalk, thereby concealing the height differential between the boardwalk and the path.  However, at trial, the plaintiff failed to proffer any evidence that the defendants mowed the grass abutting the boardwalk to the same level of the boardwalk...To the contrary, the plaintiff presented testimony of a park supervisor employed by the County, who testified that the grass was not cut to make it even with the boardwalk, but rather, the grass was cut '[d]own to the ground.'  Thus, upon the evidence presented at trial, there was no rational process by which the jury could base a finding in favor of the plaintiff on the theory that the defendants created a dangerous condition through an affirmative act of negligence....Since a general verdict sheet was submitted to the jury, we cannot ascertain whether the jury's verdict was predicated on a finding in the plaintiff's favor on the theory that the defendants breached their duty to adequately illuminate the area where the accident occurred, or on the affirmative negligence theory, which should not have been submitted to the jury...Accordingly, the interlocutory judgment must be reversed, and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a new trial on the issue of liability."

Salvatore R. Marino, Esq.

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