In Nieves v. 8 Avenue Furniture, Inc. (Index No. 24506/12, decided on March 20, 2019), the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured after being struck by a vehicle in Brooklyn. During the trial of the matter in Kings County Supreme Court, the defendant owner of the vehicle denied any knowledge of, or involvement in, the incident, and insisted that the plaintiff had identified the wrong vehicle. The jury returned a verdict holding that the defendant was liable for the incident, but that it was not a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injuries. As a result, the plaintiff timely moved pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict, contending that it was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the defendant thereafter appealed.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding, among other things, the following: "A jury finding that a party was negligent but that the negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident is contrary to the weight of the evidence 'only when the issues are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause'...Here, the defendant made no attempt to present a nonnegligent explanation for the accident; instead, it contended only that the plaintiff misidentified the van that struck her. The jury, having rejected the defendant's theory and found not only that the defendant's van was involved in the accident but also that the driver of the van was negligent in its operation, lacked a sufficient factual basis upon which to conclude that the defendant's negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the accident...."
Salvatore R. Marino, Esq.
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